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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DEPOSITIONS: TWO SUGGESTED PROCEDURAL
REFORMS
7 EJE Texas statutes concerning depositions, which were carried
over into the present Rules of Civil Procedure without mate-
rial change,' have long given a convenient and effective means of
perpetuating testimony for possible introduction into evidence at
a later trial.2 Because the right to take a deposition in Texas is a
broad one, the courts have had few occasions to inquire into the
reasons for taking a deposition. Thus, they have allowed its use for
purposes of discovering information,8 even though the wording of
the statutes and rules indicate that they were originally enacted to
facilitate the preservation of testimony." In Texas the discovery
and preservation functions of depositions have been combined
under one procedure, which is relatively simple when compared
with the detailed and complicated procedures of some states such
as New York. Apparently, the Texas statutes and rules provide a
flexible and workable system, if the lack of complaints in law
reviews and in the state bar journal as to fundamental defects
and resultant abuse can be taken as an indication. This is further
borne out by the comparatively few cases reaching our appellate
courts in proportion to the numberless depositions taken over the
years.
With respect to the scope of examination permitted in taking
a deposition in Texas, a deponent in effect is placed in the same
situation he would occupy on the witness stand at an actual trial.
In other words, the examination may extend to any matter relevant
to the case at hand which is admissible under the general rules
of evidence.5 As a practical matter, the difficulty in determining
1 TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (VERNON, 1942) Rules 176-215.
2 RAGLAND, DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 24.
3 Id. at 20.
4 Franki, Discovery, 13 Tex. B. J. 447, 479 (1950).
5 Texas Rule 213.
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relevancy of testimony prior to the trial' and when the pleadings
may or may not have been filed (if filed, they may be only rudi-
mentary) has tended to broaden een further the scope of exami-
nation. Nevertheless, the opportunity and right of the opposing
attorney to advise or instruct the deponent not to answer has
probably served to confine the scope of examination within reason-
able and sensible limits.
The scope of examination allowed under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure is not as liberal as that permitted under the
Federal Rules, which in effect employ a double standard.7 Where
the deposition is taken primarily for the purpose of perpetuating
testimony, the admissibility test is applied.' But where the reasons
for taking a deposition relate to its use as a discovery device, the
examination is authorized to extend to matters which would not
ordinarily be admissible in evidence so long as the questioning is
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible testimony.9 The vir-
tually unlimited discovery allowed under the Federal Rules and
the more confined discovery permitted under the Texas Rules
each has its advantages, but, generally speaking, the abuses which
have arisen under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or which
may possibly arise thereunder 0 have not been observed under the
Texas Rules. It is submitted that the more limited scope of exami-
nation adequately provides for the use of the deposition for
discovery and at the same time makes sensible restriction.
But this Comment is not intended as a mere tribute to the Texas
deposition practice. Despite the fact that the procedure is a work-
able and effective system which provides for both discovery and
preservation functions, it is certainly not a perfect system. There
6 Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: I, 38 Col.
L. Rev. 1436, 1442 (1938).
Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 1, 38 Col.
L. Rev. 1179, 1187 (1938).
8 Federal Rule 26(e).
9 Federal Rule 26(b).
10 See Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules,
59 Yale L. J. 117 (1950).
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are defects, and it is the purpose of this Comment to point out two
which could be corrected by changes in the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I
It is suggested that Federal Rule 32(c) should be incorporated
into the Texas Rules. It provides for a distinction between objec-
tions that are substantial in nature and those which are merely
formal. Under the Rule, objections as to substance, such as the
competency of the deponent or the relevancy and materiality of
the testimony, are not waived by failure to make them before or
-during the taking of the testimony, unless the ground for objection
is one which, if called to the attention of the examining party,
,could have been obviated at the time. Objections as to form, such
as errors and irregularities in the manner of the taking of the
deposition, if not made at the examination, immediately are
waived, unless the basis for the objection could not have been
removed by the examining counsel after it was called to his atten-
tion. Provision as to waiver of objections as to the form is made
with respect to written interrogatories by the same Rule."
Texas Rule 212 provides that when a deposition has been filed
.at least one entire day before the day on which the case is called
for trial, no objection as to the manner and form of taking the
deposition will be heard unless the objection is in writing and
-notice thereof is given to the opposing counsel before the trial
commences. Failure to comply with this Rule will result in
waiver of objections as to form.' When the objection is as to a
-matter of substance, it is made at the time the deposition is offered
into evidence.'
It is thought that the adoption of the Federal Rule will eliminate
-most of the objections as to form which Texas courts in the past
11 Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules of Evi.
,dence, 34 Ii. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1939).
11 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mix, 193 S. W. 2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
13 City of Magnolia Park v. Crooker, 252 S. W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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have had to rule upon. Certainly, it will effect a saving of the
court's time. It is admitted that the number of objections as to
form which reach the court is limited to some extent by the re-
quirement that the hearing on such objections be had at the first
term after the deposition is taken and filed." But it is urged that
most of such hearings will not be necessary if the Federal Rule is
adopted.
The present Texas Rule may be used to prevent testimony from
ever being introduced into evidence via the deposition route. For
instance, during the course of examination an opposing counsel
may note that the examining counsel has asked the deponent a
leading question. Under the Federal Rule, the opposing counsel
must immediately make his objection known, as he would have
to do if the witness were on the stand, and thus examining counsel
is given an opportunity to reword his question. Under the Texas
Rule, if the opposing counsel knows that the question can be
reworded, the wisest thing for him to do is to remain silent and
save his objection. Then shortly before trial he can make his
objection known and have the question ruled out. At such late
date the examining counsel may have to ask for a continuance or
postponement in order to get the evidence into admissible form.
There is always the possibility that the deponent may not be
available for another examination or that the attorney will lack
the time to take another deposition if he is unable to get a con-
tinuance or postponement.
Why should the examining party be so penalized for his
error in asking leading questions when he would probably suffer
no such penalty if the witness were actually on the stand? After
all, most questions objectionable as to form can be reworded or
altered so as to avoid objection and yet to elicit the same informa-
tion. Surely the present practice adds nothing to the reaching of
a just decision on the merits of a particular case.




It is also suggested that the Texas Rules be amended to curtail
the practice of allowing the introduction of a deposition as origi-
nal evidence on the trial of a suit when the deponent is actually
available or may readily be made available to testify in person
at the trial. In order to introduce a deposition as evidence, some
burden should be placed on the party seeking to introduce it to
show that the deponent is for some justifiable reason unable to
testify at the trial. Federal Rule 26 (d), for instance, expressly pro-
vides for the use of a deposition at the trial when the deponent is
sick, aged, infirm, or resides some distance away from the scene
of the trial. If the judge is not satisfied as to the reason for the
absence of the witness, he should be required to refuse its admis-
sion into evidence.
Under the Texas practice, a deposition may be introduced into
evidence even though the witness may actually be sitting in the
courtroom a few steps away from the witness stand. It is conceded
that whether it may be introduced or not rests in the discretion
of the trial judge, 5 but as a practical matter few depositions are
denied admission because the deponent is available as a witness.
Texas is in the minority among the states in following this par-
ticular practice,"6 which has been subject to criticism elsewhere.
What is wrong with allowing the introduction of depositions
under such circumstances? For one thing, the jury is deprived of
any opportunity to see and hear the witness and to judge his
credibility. The same may be said where the trial is before a
judge only. When an attorney feels that a witness will not make a
good appearance on the stand or may antagonize the jury in some
manner, it is advantageous to take the deposition of such witness
and to read it into evidence rather than to call the witness at all.
The practiced courtroom orator in reading the deposition at the
15 Cook v. Denike, 216 S. W. 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) er. dism.
16 RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 163.
17 Ragland, Discovery by Deposition, 1950 111. L. Forum 161, 171.
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trial will be able to put all the force of his own personality behind
such a reading, leading the jury to judge the credibility of the
deponent by that of the attorney who puts it into evidence.'"
Also, this practice has given rise to a great deal of confusion,
which the suggested change in the Rules would minimize. The
confusion arises particularly in the case of a witness who is not
hostile or unwilling and yet who is in possession of information
definitely favorable to one of the parties. Texas cases have held
that deposition procedure is a procedure in itself, which in no way
affects or changes the rules with regard to the examination of a
witness on the stand.'" Following this theory, the courts have
applied to the deposition the same rules of evidence used in the
examination of a witness on the stand. The party introducing the
deposition at the trial makes the deponent his witness, vouching
for his credibility." Where both parties introduce portions of a
deposition, the witness is for the purpose of impeachment the
witness of each party to the extent of the new matter introduced
by that party.2 Of course, it is a general rule of evidence that a
party cannot impeach or attack the credibility of his own witness
except under circumstances unimportant here.
Since the rules of evidence applied to the examination of an
individual at the trial and by deposition are separate and distinct
in application, a conflict may arise between the two. Industrial
Fabricating Co. v. Christopher22 may be taken as a specific
example. Plaintiff took the deposition of a witness and introduced
it in evidence in its entirety, including cross-examination and re-
direct examination. On introduction of the deposition, the deponent
became the witness of the plaintiff so far as the deposition was con-
cerned. Apparently the witness was a resident of the county where
18 RAGLAND, op. cit. supra note 2 at 163.
19 Cook v. Denike, cited supra note 15.
20 Parr v. Parr, 207 S. W. 2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) er. ref. n.r.e.
21 Fenner v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 156 S. W. 2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
er. ref. w.o..
22 220 S. W. 2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref. n.r.e.
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the suit was held, since she had been subpoenaed by the defendant.
The latter felt it necessary to rebut the information brought in by
deposition by cross-examination of the witness. He called the
witness to the stand and attempted to cross-examine and impeach
but was refused this right on the ground that in calling her, he
made her his witness so far as the oral examination was concerned.
The witness therefore belonged to both parties with respect to the
same matter. Of course, the defendant had had the right to cross-
examine in the taking of the deposition, but possibly he had felt
it advisable to make only a brief examination and to wait until
he had the witness on the stand to make a full cross-examination.
Certainly the right to cross-examine a witness on the stand is the
more valuable, since the witness is under the pressure of testifying
before the judge and jury. If the theory that a deposition exami-
nation in no way alters or affects an examination before the court
were followed to its logical end, the plaintiff in the Christopher
case could have taken the witness over and subjected her to cross-
examination after the defendant had made her his witness by
putting her on the stand.
Suppose in the Christopher case that the defendant had not
seen fit, possibly because of the time and expense involved, to
cross-examine the witness when the deposition was taken. In such
a case, he would be deprived of his right ever to cross-examine
the witness. It would be an unfair result indeed if the defendant
had wished to impeach the deposition; presumably he would have
been refused the right, as he would vouch for the credibility of
the witness in putting her on the stand.
The recommended amendment would bring about a more just
result and eliminate some of the "game" in litigation. In the
case above, under the suggested change, the plaintiff would have
been forced to put the witness on the stand if he expected to use
her. The witness would then belong to the plaintiff, and the defend-
ant could then exercise his right to cross-examine and impeach.
There would be none of the confusion or question which arose in
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